1965AND2020

Two attempts to rebuild economic management — and what their stalling means for open planning

Both attempts began with the question of which indicator to judge work by. In 1965 the number of mandatory plan indicators for an enterprise was cut from 30 to 9, with profit and profitability made central. In 2011–2012 experts described a shift to a growth model not based on raw materials. Both stalled not on the idea but on delivery. We are not comparing scale — a block standard is not a national plan. We are comparing the mechanism: it breaks in the same places, and those places need strengthening in advance.

The 1965 economic reform

What changed: Regional economic councils were abolished and branch ministries restored. An enterprise now had 9 directive indicators instead of 30. It set its own product range and headcount, and from profit it formed funds for production development, material incentives, social and cultural needs and housing construction.
How delivery was measured: Profit and profitability — profit relative to fixed assets and standard working capital. Targets remained for output volume, key products in physical units, the wage fund, budget payments, capital investment, new technology and deliveries.
Who was accountable: The Council of Ministers under A. N. Kosygin and the USSR Gosplan; each enterprise reported to its ministry. The theoretical case is associated with E. G. Liberman. R. A. Belousov took part in drafting it and later wrote the multi-volume Economic History of Russia: the 20th Century.
What stopped it: Gross revenue stayed in the plan and pushed towards costly schemes and rising prices; from 1971 directive labour productivity targets returned. The Shchekino experiment — a fixed wage fund with savings kept by the workforce — raised productivity, but in 1976 the plant, running at 143% of design capacity, missed its plan and lost its bonuses. Oil revenue after Samotlor came online and the 1973 crisis made it possible to change nothing.
Outcome: The eighth five-year plan of 1966–1970 delivered strong growth. By the early 1970s the reform had been wound down and the economy returned to rigid directive planning.

Concept 2020 and Strategy 2020

What changed: These are two different documents. The Concept of Long-Term Development to 2020 was approved by Government Order No. 1662-r of 17 November 2008. Strategy 2020, “A New Growth Model — a New Social Policy”, is an expert report of 2011–2012 on moving away from a raw-materials economy; it was never approved.
How delivery was measured: There was no built-in mechanism. The Center for Strategic Research reached its 2016 estimate of “roughly one third implemented” from 30 interviews and questionnaires of the Strategy’s authors — expert opinion, not calculation against indicators.
Who was accountable: Formally, the Government. According to the CSR, those who were to carry the Strategy out took little part in drafting it. In parallel, goals were set by national projects, the May decrees and more than 40 state programmes.
What stopped it: The Concept was out of date the moment it was adopted: the global crisis changed the conditions and there was no mechanism to rewrite the document quickly. The Strategy remained a “declaration of intent” and never became the government’s work plan. The previous administrative reform, in A. L. Kudrin’s words, “drowned” in a flood of petrodollars.
Outcome: Strategy 2020 was implemented roughly by one third — by the CSR’s 2016 expert estimate. Concept 2020 had not been repealed at that point, but it never guided the government.

The common factor — money without effort

In both cases the sources name the same cause: rising oil revenue removed the pressure that had prompted the reform. When the budget grows on its own, an efficiency indicator stops interesting anyone. What follows is our reasoning, not the sources’ conclusion: a standard must not rely on someone currently finding it profitable to meet. It must stay verifiable even when nobody wants to verify it.

Three answers to the same questions

Question	1965	2020	Green block standard
What changed	The number and make-up of enterprise indicators	The country’s growth model	Requirements for the green area of a block of existing development
How delivery was measured	The enterprise’s report to its ministry	Expert interviews five years later	A calculation from open data that anyone can repeat — the nine indicators of the nomenclature
Who calculates	The party being assessed, and its ministry	Nobody assigned	Anyone: the method and the data are open, the calculation is repeatable
What stopped it	A gross indicator in the plan, directives returning, oil revenue	The 2008 crisis, no revision mechanism, implementers left out of drafting	The same risks: interest fades, the document ages, implementers see it as someone else’s
How we guard against it	—	—	The standardisation procedure: public consultation and revision of the standard. District administrations and developers are invited into drafting. The register of data gaps is open

What we take into the project

Few indicators, each one measurable

Nine instead of thirty was the right direction in 1965. Our nomenclature also has nine indicators: five can already be computed from open data, and for the rest we state plainly which data are missing.

Judging by outcome, not by volume of work

The reform tried to move away from gross output. For a block this means assessing the measured state of the area, not a report of how much was planted and spent.

Savings stay with whoever achieved them

The key finding of the Shchekino experiment. Our proposal for discussion: if a block meets the indicators below the estimate, the savings stay with the district for its own improvements.

Rules that do not change retroactively

The Shchekino wage fund was fixed for four years — and the experiment worked while that promise was kept. The standard’s requirements hold until the scheduled revision and are not tightened for work already done.

We set the goal, not the method

The 1965 enterprise chose its own product range. The standard sets a measurable outcome, not a list of plants and structures: how to achieve it is for the implementer to decide.

Revision built in from day one

Concept 2020 could not be rewritten quickly when conditions changed. The standardisation procedure provides for revising a standard, and from the start we record which indicators we will refine and from which data.

What we do not repeat

An indicator worth inflating

Gross revenue in the plan pushed towards costly schemes. None of our indicators rises because more money was spent on a block.

Punishment for success

A plant running at 143% of capacity lost its bonuses for missing the plan. Exceeding a requirement does not become a new bar that is then punished when missed.

A document with no delivery mechanism

Strategy 2020 remained a declaration. For each of our indicators we record the data and formula it is computed from and the document that fixes it.

Opinion instead of calculation

Delivery of Strategy 2020 was assessed through interviews. Delivery of the standard is assessed by a number that can be recomputed from the same open data.

What this page does not claim

We do not put a single block standard on a par with a national reform, and we do not claim to understand why the reforms stalled better than historians do. The facts come from the sources below. The sections “What we take into the project” and “What we do not repeat” are our reasoning. We have not yet read R. A. Belousov’s own texts, so no assessments are given here in his name.

Sources

All links checked on 13 September 2026. The CSR’s “roughly one third” estimate refers to the unapproved Strategy 2020, not to Concept No. 1662-r — the CSR itself draws this distinction. The sources are in Russian.